State v. Tinoco Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 39659 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-9-2013
State v. Tinoco Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39659
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Tinoco Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39659" (2013). Not Reported. 747.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/747
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 











S.Ct. No. 39659-2012 
vs. District Case No. CR-2011-8142-C 
JORGE FERREIRA TINOCO, 
Appellant. 
Robyn Fyffe 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Canyon 
HONORABLE BRADLEY S. FORD 
District Judge 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Appellant 
-
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
(208) 334-2400 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
II. Argument in Reply ...................................................... 1 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Tinoco' s Motion to Dismiss Because the 
Delay in Bringing Him to Trial Violated His Speedy Trial Rights ............ 1 
1. Section 19-3501 governs the period before and following a mistrial .... 1 
2. The time period between a mistrial and retrial applies in the constitutional 
speedy trial analysis .......................................... 3 
III. Conclusion ............................................................ 4 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) .................................................................................. 1, 3, 4 
United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................... 3 
STATE CASES 
BHC Intermountain Hospital, Inc. v. Ada County, 150 Idaho 93,244 P.3d 237 (2010) .............. 2 
Clayton v. State, 822 So. 2d 1141 (Miss. App. 2002) ................................................................... 4 
State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 704,931 P.2d 1222 (Ct. App. 1996) ................................................... 2 
State v. Manley, 220 S.W.3d 116 (Tex. App. 2007) ..................................................................... 4 
State v. O'Neal, 203 P.3d 135 (N.M. App. 2008) ......................................................................... 4 
State v. Scroggie, 114 Idaho 188, 755 P.2d 485 (Ct. App. 1988) ............................................. 2, 3 
State v. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249,658 P.2d 920 (1983) ................................................................ 2 
State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 29 P.3d 949 (2001) ...................................................................... 2 
State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007) ............................................................ 2 
DOCKETED CASES 
Goncalves v. Com., S.W.3d _, Supreme Court of Kentucky Docket No. 2010-SC-
000142-MR (February 21, 2013) (2013 WL 646171) ................................................................... 3 
STATE STATUTES 
LC.§ 19-3501(3) ................................................................................................................... 1, 2, 3 
11 
II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Tinoco's lVIotion to Dismiss Because the 
Delay in Bringing Him to Trial Violated His Speedy Trial Rights 
Mr. Tinoco's trial was delayed outside the speedy trial period because of the district 
court's error. Because the reason for the delay cannot constitute "good cause," the case should 
have been dismissed without resorting to analysis of the factors established by Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514 (1972). Even when those factors are considered, the circumstances demonstrate 
that Mr. Tinoco's rights to speedy trial as protected by LC.§ 19-3501(3) and the state and 
federal constitutions were violated and that the case should have been dismissed. 
The state urges that Mr. Tinoco's claim is "without merit" because his first trial, which 
ended in mistrial due to the district court's error, occurred within six months. See Respondent's 
Brief, p. 5. Without citation to authority beyond the language ofl.C. § 19-3501, the state 
contends that "the statute does not require a trial must go [sic] to verdict with six months of 
arraignment." Id. Initially, the statutory phrase "brought to trial" must be construed within the 
context of the right the statute was enacted to protect and, thus, cannot refer to a trial that ends 
prior to the presentation of evidence. Further, Mr. Tinoco's motion to dismiss was filed pursuant 
to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution in addition to LC.§ 19-3501. Even if the period prior to the mistrial is not 
considered under the statutory analysis, it should be under the constitutional analysis. 
1. Section 19-3501 governs the period before and following a mistrial 
The "court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the ... indictment to 
be dismissed ... if a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not 
brought to trial within [six months] from the date that the defendant was arraigned." LC. § 
19-3501(3). The clear and plain language of the statute does not refer to any period following a 
remittitur from an appeal after a trial has once been held. State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 704, 706, 
931 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Scroggie, 114 Idaho 188, 190, 755 P.2d 485,487 
(Ct. App. 1988). However, a mistrial fails to bring about any resolution to a case whereas a 
retrial following an appeal occurs after a defendant has been brought to a trial that resulted in a 
verdict. In State v. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249,658 P.2d 920 (1983), the defendant explicitly 
complained about the delay between a first trial, which resulted in mistrial, and a second trial. 
The defendant did not argue and the Court did not address whether the period prior to the first 
trial could be properly considered in the speedy trial analysis. Thus, it does not appear that Idaho 
has addressed the significance of the phrase "brought to trial" in the context of a mistrial. 
Further, the phrase "brought to trial" can be reasonably limited to refer to a trial that 
adjudicates the charges faced by the accused or, as contended by the state, the mere 
commencement of trial. When a statute's language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction, it is ambiguous and a must be construed with legislative intent in mind, which is 
ascertained by examining the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind 
the statute, and its legislative history in addition to the literal words of the statute. BHC 
Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada County, 150 Idaho 93, 95,244 P.3d 237,239 (2010); State v. 
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475, 163P.3d1183, 1187 (2007). 
The right to a speedy trial is designed: (I) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) 
to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense 
will be impaired. State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 118, 29 P.3d 949, 954 (2001). Mr. Tinoco 
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remained in custody throughout the proceedings and it is hard to perceive how the mistrial due to 
the Batson issue helped minimize his anxiety. At least where a mistrial is declared after a 
deadlocked jury, the defense can be said to have derived some benefit from the opportunity to 
test the state's case. Here, no evidence was presented and the mistrial's occurrence addressed 
none of the concerns the legislature meant to address in enacting LC.§ 19-3501(3). 
Further, a delay caused by a mistrial could be attributable to the defense, prosecution or, 
as here, the district court. Whether a mistrial warrants dismissal on speedy trial grounds is best 
assessed by application of the Barker v. Wingo factors and assessing whether the mistrial 
constituted good cause. Accordingly, the phrase "brought to trial" within the meaning of LC. § 
19-3501 contemplates a trial that results in a verdict. 
2. The time period between a mistrial and retrial applies in the constitutional 
speedy trial analysis 
"In the absence of a statute explicitly setting the time frame within which a retrial must 
occur following an appeal, the speedy trial inquiry should be approached with the constitutional 
analysis, applying the Barker balancing test." Scroggie, 114 Idaho at 190, 755 P.2d at 487. 
Although some states have adopted the position that the speedy trial "clock" starts anew 
following a mistrial, other jurisdictions hold that the speedy trial analysis applies to the time 
period between a mistrial and retrial. Goncalves v. Com., _S.W.3d _, Supreme Court 
of Kentucky Docket No. 2010-SC-000142-MR (February 21, 2013) (2013 WL 646171). The 
"latter approach is appropriate because the four-factor Barker analysis allow for full and proper 
consideration of intervening mistrials under the second factor, the reasons for delay." Id.; see 
also United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 272 ( 4th Cir. 2009) (noting "at least three valid bases" 
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for delay including mistrial in addition to complicated prosecution and defense pre-trial 
proceedings); Clayton v. State, 822 So.2d 1141, 1145 (Miss. App. 2002) (when a trial results in a 
mistrial, the time ofretrial remains within the discretion of the trial court, although a substantial 
delay may still violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial); State v. O'Neal, 203 P.3d 135, 
142 (N.M. App. 2008) (considering mistrial among various reasons for delay); State v. Manley, 
220 S.W.3d 116, 124 (Tex. App. 2007) (same). 
Even if the statutory obligation to bring a defendant to trial within six months is satisfied 
by a trial that ends in mistrial, a mistrial does not satisfy the constitutional guarantee of a speedy 
trial. Rather, the delay caused by a mistrial must be evaluated in the context of the Barker factors 
including the reason for the delay occasioned by the mistrial. As discussed in greater detail in 
Mr. Tinoco' s Opening Brief, his trial was delayed because the district court misled counsel as to 
when the Batson challenge could be heard, which ultimately required the district court to declare 
a mistrial. As found by the district court, Mr. Tinoco "stood on his speedy trial rights" 
throughout the proceedings" [Tr. Vol. 5, p. 33, ln. 18-21] and was continually incarcerated. The 
reason for the delay, weighed against the other Barker factors, establishes that Mr. Tinoco's 
constitutional speedy trial rights were violated. Accordingly, this Court should reverse Mr. 
Tinoco' s judgment of conviction and sentences and remand this case with instruction to grant the 
motion to dismiss. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Tinoco's Opening Brief, he respectfully asks 
that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and sentences and remand for further 
proceedings. 
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Respectfully submitted this __j_ day of July, 2013. 
~f{fe 
Attorney for Jorge Tinoco 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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